
The most accurate network diagram in your organization is often in the head of the technician who works nights.
Many OT risk assessments never reach that person. They run on a questionnaire sent to management, a review of policy documents and, too often, a vulnerability scan borrowed from IT. The result describes how the site is supposed to work. Your risk sits in how it does work.
ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 gives you a sound structure. Define the system under consideration, run an initial assessment based on worst-case consequence, divide the system into zones and conduits, then assess each zone in detail and record the security requirements.
The order matters. Begin with the question "what is the worst this system can do?" A chiller plant serving a data centre, a fuel system at an airport and a lighting controller in a parking garage carry different consequences, even if they run the same controller with the same CVEs. Ranking by consequence first stops you spending the assessment budget on systems that cannot hurt anyone.
Use the questionnaire to plan the visit, not to replace it. Then interview operators, technicians and controls engineers, separately from their managers. Ask questions with concrete answers:
The answers to the last question tell you how much of your detection depends on alarms nobody trusts.
Then confirm what you heard. Open controller cabinets, trace cables from the BAS network to wherever they end, and check the plant room workstations. In Part 6 of our foundation series we described a cellular modem we found wired to a supervisory controller during a cabinet inspection. It bypassed the corporate VPN. No questionnaire would have surfaced it, and network tools might not have either.
Most of what you need comes from passive observation. Take a capture from a switch mirror port at the OT boundary for at least a full business day, longer if the site runs weekly schedules. Free tools do the job:
Passive capture never sends a packet to a device. Use it, and only it, on mission-critical processes.
Active scanning has a place: in non-critical environments, on a test bench with the same firmware, or in a maintenance window with the vendor present and the scan rate turned down. Tools such as Nmap and Greenbone OpenVAS find open services and outdated software that passive capture can miss. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security warns that automated vulnerability tools "may cause devices to behave erratically, stop working/crash, or restart." In the same Part 6 post we described an owner whose untested IT scan took about 60% of more than a thousand building devices offline, with 15 days to restore and re-verify them. Treat active scanning in OT as a change, with a plan to roll it back.
A controller with ten CVEs inside a well-segmented zone is a lower priority than a remote access server with one. Most field devices are insecure by design: once an attacker reaches them, they need no exploit. Weight your findings by how an attacker would get there: internet exposure, remote access paths, the IT and OT boundary and DMZ systems. Severity scores alone do not tell you that.
Keep the deliverable short. For each zone: its consequence rating, how it can be reached, the evidence you collected and the three actions that reduce the most risk. A 200-page report with every finding at equal weight gets shelved. A ranked list per zone feeds directly into gap management and the next maintenance contract.
If your findings would surprise the night shift technician, check them again. If they surprise your executives, you have probably found the real picture.
Start with consequence, not vulnerabilities. Use ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 to define the system, rate the worst-case consequence, divide it into zones and conduits, and assess each zone in detail. Then interview operators, walk the site and use passive capture before any scanning.
Use passive capture, and only passive capture, on mission-critical processes. Active scanning belongs in non-critical environments, on a test bench with the same firmware, or in a maintenance window with the vendor present and the scan rate turned down. Treat it as a change, with a plan to roll it back.
Wireshark for reading individual conversations, Zeek with CISA's ICSNPP parsers for searchable logs of industrial protocols, and Malcolm, which packages Zeek, Arkime and dashboards for analyzing captures.
Planning a new smart building, upgrading the systems in an existing one, or buying technology for a facility? Actimeta is an OT cybersecurity and technology advisory firm that helps owners get the design, the vendors and the security right from the start. Our building assessment service reviews your building systems against ISO/IEC 62443, ISO/IEC 27001 and ISF and gives you clear remediation plans. Our system architecture services design building systems for interoperability, resilience and cybersecurity. Our project management team oversees delivery through to commissioning. Book a free consultation to talk through your project.