
The attack that locked more than 30 US water utilities out of their own controllers in 2026 did not need a zero-day. It needed default passwords and controllers on the internet.
Most trend lists for this year lead with AI and nation-state tooling, and most are written from Washington or Brussels. The evidence points somewhere less dramatic, and the picture changes when you look from Warsaw, New Delhi, Taipei or Tokyo. Below are six shifts we see in North America and Europe, then what the view from the East adds.
In April 2026, the FBI, CISA, NSA and four other US agencies published advisory AA26-097A on Iranian-affiliated actors altering PLC project files across government facilities, water and energy. The July update describes logic changes that "disabled critical shutdown and alarm logic". In late July, more than 30 Minnesota water and wastewater utilities lost control of internet-facing PLCs, reached through cellular gateways and accessed with default credentials. In October, attacks on internet-exposed refrigeration controllers in hundreds of French supermarkets led CERT-FR to tell operators to remove internet exposure and review defrost schedules.
Keep the scale in proportion. These are low-skill attacks on exposed devices, and the impact so far has been local. What changed is that attackers now touch the process. Count your internet-reachable OT systems. That number should be zero.
Dragos counted 1,140 ransomware incidents affecting industrial organizations in the second quarter of 2026, 747 of them in manufacturing. That is vendor research based on leak site postings, so it counts victims, not plants that stopped. The plants that stopped are well documented. Jaguar Land Rover halted UK production in September 2025, and the UK government backed a £1.5 billion loan guarantee. In Japan, ransomware the same month halted Asahi's production at six facilities, and the company fell back to manual ordering. In most of these cases the attackers never touched a PLC. Production stopped because scheduling, ordering or the decision to isolate depended on IT.
Know which IT systems your production cannot run without, and practise running without them.
On September 23, 2026, CISA and the FBI issued a fact sheet for operators working with third-party ICS integrators: least privilege, contract clauses covering remote access and patching, and integrator access only through routes you can monitor. Weeks later, an authentication bypass in BeyondTrust Remote Support, CVE-2026-102764, was exploited in the wild and prompted an alert from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security on October 16. It is an IT support tool, but many vendors use tools like it to reach OT.
List every remote path into your sites, including the ones vendors set up for themselves.
Canada's Bill C-8 received Royal Assent in June 2026, creating the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act for federally regulated finance, telecommunications, energy and transport. Its regulations, and most in-force dates, were still pending at the time of writing. Under the EU Cyber Resilience Act, manufacturers have had to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through ENISA's platform since September 11, 2026. The UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is before the House of Lords. In the US, the CIRCIA final rule had not been published at the time of writing.
In December 2025, CISA, the Australian Cyber Security Centre and partners including the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and Germany's BSI published principles for integrating AI into OT: "AI such as LLMs almost certainly should not be used to make safety decisions for OT environments." In vendor-sponsored research by Takepoint, published in July 2026, 5% of respondents ran agentic AI in production for OT security, and about 12% had mapped which AI decisions could affect physical processes or safety. The question for you is which data leaves your OT network to feed an AI service, and which AI outputs can write back to a controller.
The initial public draft of NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 4, released September 21, 2026, expands its coverage of building automation and control systems. For owners of commercial, institutional and campus buildings, that ends the argument that OT security guidance is for factories and utilities.
Russia: from disruption to destruction. On December 29, 2025, attackers hit grid connection substations at more than 30 wind and solar farms in Poland and a combined heat and power plant serving close to half a million customers. CERT Polska reported corrupted RTU firmware, damaged HMIs and protection relays, and wiper malware. Generation continued and heat supply held, but operators lost remote control of the renewable sites. CERT Polska linked the infrastructure to a cluster tracked as Berserk Bear or Static Tundra, while stopping short of formal attribution. At the low end, a December 2025 joint advisory co-sealed by the Cyber Centre and CSIS warned that pro-Russia hacktivists, including CARR and Z-Pentest, use weakly secured VNC connections to reach OT devices. Norway's counter-intelligence service (PST) attributed a brief takeover of a dam in April 2025 to pro-Russian hackers.
China: long-term access and supply-chain pressure. Taiwan's National Security Bureau counted an average of 2.63 million intrusion attempts a day against its critical infrastructure in 2025, attributed to China-linked groups, with attacks on the energy sector up about tenfold. Those are attempts, not compromises. Governments are now treating equipment as the exposure. Lithuania has barred Chinese companies from remote access to solar, wind and battery systems above 100 kW since May 2025. The European Commission proposed a high-risk supplier framework in January 2026, citing solar inverters, which was still a proposal at the time of writing. US Executive Order 14420 of August 2026 restricts US imports of certain bulk power system equipment from foreign adversaries. China, for its part, raised maximum fines where a violation cripples a critical information infrastructure function, in a Cybersecurity Law amendment in force since January 1, 2026.
Middle East: conflict sets the target list. The agencies behind AA26-097A tie the escalation in Iranian-affiliated PLC targeting to US and Iran hostilities. If you operate in the Gulf or serve clients there, expect activity to track the region's politics. In Saudi Arabia, OTCC-1:2022 remains the mandatory OT baseline for critical facilities.
India: binding rules for power, and a lesson in disinformation. The Central Electricity Authority's Cyber Security in Power Sector Regulations, 2026 take effect on April 1, 2027. They apply to OT linked to the grid, including generation and storage of 50 MW and above, require incident reports within six hours, and require OT to be physically separated from IT and the internet. During the India and Pakistan conflict in May 2025, India's Press Information Bureau debunked viral claims that hackers had disabled 70% of the national grid. Expect false claims of OT attacks to arrive faster than the facts.
Japan and Singapore: the state steps in, and the horizon lengthens. Japan began active cyber defence operations on October 1, 2026, under a law passed in May 2025 that allows police and the Self-Defense Forces to act against attackers' servers. Singapore's Cyber Security Agency set 2031 as the target for critical information infrastructure to become quantum-safe, and its new grant names OT and legacy systems as a priority. For assets with 20-year lives, that deadline is already inside your replacement cycle.
East and West, the entry points are the same: internet-exposed HMIs and PLCs, cellular gateways and vendor remote access. What differs by region is who is attacking, why, and what your regulator expects next. If you operate across borders, add two questions to every procurement: where the equipment comes from, and who can reach it remotely. Attackers, regulators and insurers are all asking the second one already.
Controller attacks, ransomware, vendor access, regulation, AI and building standards.
Count internet-reachable OT systems. It should be zero.
Scheduling, ordering and the decision to isolate often depend on IT systems.
Planning a new smart building or plant, upgrading the systems in an existing one, or buying technology for a facility? Actimeta is an OT cybersecurity and technology advisory firm that helps owners get the design, the vendors and the security right from the start.