
It is 6:40 on a Tuesday morning when your controls contractor calls. Their office network was encrypted overnight. They do not yet know how the attackers got in, whether the remote access tool they use to service your buildings was touched, or when their technicians will have laptops again.
This is a hypothetical scenario. It is built from things that have happened. In September 2025, a ransomware attack on Collins Aerospace's MUSE check-in and baggage drop software sent Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin airports back to manual check-in for days. In October 2026, attackers hijacked refrigeration controllers across French supermarkets, and E.Leclerc confirmed repercussions on cooling equipment in several stores. And in September 2026, the FBI and CISA described an intrusion at a US industrial automation company where attackers searched for "SCADA" and "customers" and staged about 800 files of client schematics and device details for theft.
Your provider is not the target. It is the route to forty clients at once. Use the scenario as a tabletop with your facility, IT and security leads, and answer each question for your own portfolio.
Your first decision is whether to disconnect the provider's remote access to your sites. Make it without waiting for certainty. A building can run for days without its service contractor. It cannot easily recover from an attacker who used that contractor's account to change your controllers.
The questions that decide whether you can act:
If any answer is "we would have to ask them", that is the first finding of the exercise. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's September 2026 guidance on attacks against exposed controllers makes the same point: validate the external connections your integrators and service providers hold.
Next, decide whether to trust what your BAS front-end shows. Check the things an attacker would change: setpoints on critical spaces, schedules, alarm limits and disabled alarms, and new or changed user accounts. Compare them against a known-good configuration.
That assumes you have one. In many portfolios, the most recent copy of the controller programs and front-end database sits on the provider's network, which is now encrypted. Ask yourself today where your copy is, how old it is, and whether it is offline.
Then decide where to send people. Data rooms, labs, freezers, pharmacy storage and patient areas need someone on site who can read local displays, check independent thermometers and run equipment in hand mode if the front-end cannot be trusted.
Pull the service contract. Does it require the provider to notify you of an incident, and within what time? Does it say who pays for your staff overtime, spoiled inventory or an independent investigation? For most older BAS contracts the answer is that it says nothing.
Check your reporting obligations. Under NIS2, an essential or important entity in the EU must send an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident. In Canada, Bill C-8's reporting duties apply only to designated operators in federally regulated sectors once the regulations are in force, which they were not at the time of writing. US operators should check sector rules, as the CIRCIA final rule had not been published at the time of writing either.
Finally, set the conditions for reconnecting the provider: clean devices, new credentials for every technician, access only through your gateway, and named people only. The FBI and CISA recommend requiring integrators to provide a list of authorized personnel. Saudi Arabia's OTCC-1:2022 already requires cybersecurity requirements in OT procurement and periodic assessment of third-party providers.
Three outputs, each within your team's means:
You chose your service provider for their skill with your systems. Their network security came with the contract whether you reviewed it or not.
Next in this series: someone changes your chiller setpoints during a heat wave.
The risk that comes from service providers, integrators and vendors who hold access to your control systems, so an attack on them becomes an attack on you.
Make the call without waiting for certainty. A building can run for days without its contractor, but it cannot easily recover from an attacker using that contractor's account.
A list of every remote path, an offline copy of controller programs, and contract terms for incident notice, named personnel and gateway-only access.
Planning a new smart building, upgrading the systems in an existing one, or buying technology for a facility? Actimeta is an OT cybersecurity and technology advisory firm that helps owners get the design, the vendors and the security right from the start.