
In October 2025, unauthorized messages played over the public address systems at the Kelowna, Victoria and Windsor airports, and at Harrisburg in Pennsylvania. Nobody broke into those airports. According to the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, the attackers compromised a cloud-based service provider widely used by airports, and reached the three Canadian airports through it. Harrisburg was also affected.
The same month, a pro-Hamas actor got into an internet-connected supervisory fuel tank gauging system at a Canadian airport. The investigation found the actor could view system information but could not control it.
Neither incident put an aircraft at risk. Both show where an airport's exposure sits: in the building and support systems around aviation, and in suppliers shared by many airports. In its October 2026 report on the cyber threat to aviation, the Cyber Centre judged that a growing number of non-state actors are targeting internet-connected OT, including at Canadian airports. It also judged that financially motivated cybercriminals remain the most likely threat to the sector.
An airport terminal is a large building, and its OT starts with what any large building has: HVAC and a building management system, power distribution, utility metering, lighting, fire systems and access control. Then the aviation systems arrive. Baggage handling, airfield lighting, fuel management, flight information displays, public address, and common-use passenger processing platforms that let several airlines share the same check-in desks and gates. ENISA and the US Airport Cooperative Research Program list most of these among the systems that need protection.
What makes airports hard is not the technology. It is ownership. The airport authority may own the terminal BMS while a contractor runs the baggage system, a fuel consortium runs the fuel farm, airlines and ground handlers bring their own equipment, and a software provider hosts the displays and PA in the cloud. Many of these systems share physical space, cabling and sometimes network infrastructure. Each party secures its own piece, and nobody owns the seams.
On September 19, 2025, RTX became aware of a ransomware incident affecting systems that support MUSE, Collins Aerospace's software for shared check-in and gate resources. Heathrow, Berlin Brandenburg, Brussels and Dublin were affected. Gate agents verified passengers manually, wrote baggage tags by hand and coordinated gate changes by two-way radio. Brussels Airport asked airlines to cancel about 10% of flights through September 28 and expected normal operations from September 29.
The ransomware did not touch a controller. The disruption came from one supplier serving many airports, and the recovery depended on staff who could still do the work by hand. That is the airport version of consequence reduction: you cannot stop every supplier from being breached, but you can decide how long you can operate without them. What If? Part 1 walks through the same problem for a building automation provider.
In the US, TSA issued an emergency cybersecurity amendment in March 2023 requiring certain airport and aircraft operators to segment OT from IT, control access, monitor continuously and patch on a risk basis. In the EU, NIS2 covers airport managing bodies and entities operating ancillary installations within airports, and the aviation information security rule for aerodrome operators, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1645, has applied since October 16, 2025. In Canada, Bill C-8 lists federally regulated transportation as a vital service; operators had not been designated at the time of writing. In the Gulf, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority publishes a civil aviation cybersecurity policy and guidelines, and operators designated as critical national infrastructure in Saudi Arabia fall under the NCA's OT Cybersecurity Controls.
None of these rules assigns the seams between owners. Your contracts do. An airport's attack surface is drawn as much by who signed what as by how the network is built.
Next in this series: ports and logistics.
Unclear ownership between the many parties on an airport campus, supervisory systems exposed to the internet, and cloud services shared by many airports.
Map each system: the owner, the operator, the vendor, every remote access path, and what the terminal does if that system stops.
It depends on the country. The US has a TSA amendment, the EU has NIS2 and Part-IS, Canada has Bill C-8, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia have national aviation and OT controls. None of them assigns the seams between owners, so contracts have to.
Planning a new smart building, upgrading the systems in an existing one, or buying technology for a facility? Actimeta is an OT cybersecurity and technology advisory firm that helps owners get the design, the vendors and the security right from the start.