
On the night of November 1, refrigerated cases in supermarkets across Belgium, Sweden and Ireland started to warm up. Dozens of Delhaize stores in Belgium were affected. In Ireland, 13 SuperValu stores pulled chilled and frozen stock as a precaution. Three weeks earlier, the same pattern had hit hundreds of stores in France.
The attackers changed settings on internet-exposed refrigeration controllers. Nothing about the method was new, and the first fix is still prevention: those controllers should never have been reachable from the internet. This post is about the night that fix was missed. What decides whether that night becomes a costly week is how fast you notice, decide and restore.
France's blood service, the Établissement français du sang (EFS), said attackers reached cold rooms at three of its sites through its refrigeration contractor and set temperature and defrost thresholds far out of range. Monitoring and alarms caught the change quickly. Staff moved products to other facilities, collection and distribution continued, and EFS reported that no blood products were altered.
That outcome was decided before the attack: alarms that someone watched, authority to move stock without waiting for a meeting, and other sites ready to receive it. That is what an OT incident response plan is for.
On November 5, CISA, the FBI, HHS, USDA and the US Department of Transportation published a joint fact sheet on hardening industrial refrigeration and cold chain monitoring systems. Most of its actions are preventive. Two are about response: keep tested backups offsite and offline, and set limits on setpoints with alerts when they are exceeded.
Your corporate incident response plan probably assumes the right move is to isolate, wipe and rebuild. In OT the first questions are different. Is the process still safe? Can you run it without the control system, and for how long?
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says OT responses "can range from doing nothing to performing a full system shutdown", including a move to manual operations. The right choice depends on the process, and the people who understand the process work in operations and engineering. NIST's draft Rev. 4, open for comment until November 30, extends the guidance to building automation and to food and agriculture.
Colonial Pipeline's CEO told the US Senate in 2021 that the company shut down its pipeline after ransomware hit its IT systems because even a one percent chance that OT was compromised justified it. Investigators found no evidence the attackers reached OT. You can debate that call. The point is that it was made under pressure, without a decision agreed in advance.
Restoring a controller is slow. You need the right firmware version, the last good configuration, a licensed copy of the engineering software and someone who knows the system. CERT-FR told the French operators that a factory reset alone was not enough: each unit had to be reconfigured before it went back into service. If your last configuration backup dates from commissioning, you will be rebuilding from memory.
Test the restore, not only the backup. This quarter, restore one controller's configuration to a spare or bench unit and time it. Then run a one-hour tabletop with the night shift and your main BAS or refrigeration contractor, using the supermarket attacks as the scenario. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends regular tabletop exercises for exactly this reason. A ready-made scenario is in What If? Part 1.
Track two numbers: the time to put a critical system into manual operation, and the time to restore one controller to its last good configuration. They describe your exposure better than any count of alerts.
An attacker decides when your incident starts. Your preparation decides how long it lasts.
Next in this series: vulnerability management when you cannot patch.
Decision rights on every shift, safe states and manual modes, signs operators recognize, vendor contacts and access, offline copies and reporting duties.
In OT the first questions are whether the process is still safe and whether you can run it without the control system, not whether to isolate, wipe and rebuild.
The time to put a critical system into manual operation, and the time to restore one controller to its last good configuration.
Planning a new smart building or plant, upgrading the systems in an existing one, or buying technology for a facility? Actimeta is an OT cybersecurity and technology advisory firm that helps owners get the design, the vendors and the security right from the start.